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 This paper is an exploration of the ethics of espionage, specifically as it pertains 
to the human dimension.  In it, I discuss the ethical aspects of some specific cases and 
questions about which moral theory we should use to evaluate and guide human 
intelligence (HUMINT) collection operations.         
 The topic will be explored through three major sections.  The first section 
concerns some initial philosophical considerations and questions of the self.  The 
second section is a presentation and analysis of three hypothetical case studies from 
the field.  The final section is a much broader look at the socio-political considerations 
that are relevant to HUMINT collection. 
 It is my contention that justifying cases of HUMINT collection outside of a 
utilitarian construct is a challenge.  While most HUMINT operations are best justified by 
utilitarian moral theories, justifying all HUMINT operations in terms of a utilitarian 
construct creates the potential risk of justifying acts that are so morally egregious that 














I would look to offer my sincerest thanks to: 
Professor Brad Cokelet for making the time… 
Two gentlemen from the intelligence community for their guidance and direction… 





















Table of Contents 
Thesis       1     
 Initial Philosophical Considerations  3 
 Case Studies     14 
 Socio-Political Considerations   25 




















 Espionage has existed since ancient times.  Specifically, human espionage has 
existed as long as there has been conflict between human beings.  It is one of the 
oldest professions in existence.  Today, due to the advancement of modern 
technologies, spying can take many different forms and characteristics, but passing 
information between two individual human beings continues to persist.  Lying, 
deception, and manipulation are tools used by spies, or human intelligence (HUMINT) 
collectors, for the purpose of obtaining information that can be processed and analyzed 
to the point that it can serve as valuable intelligence for intelligence customers.  
Generally, this intelligence is utilized by customers for the purpose of decision-making, 
and at the highest ends of government, decision-making in terms of shaping foreign 
policy and national security objectives.  For some perspective, it is widely held that both 
Russia and China have more clandestine intelligence operatives inside the United 
States now, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, than at the height of the 
Cold War (Crumpton, 4).    
 But how can a nation ask its countrymen and women to lie, deceive, and 
manipulate foreign nationals to commit espionage against their respective country for 
the sake of foreign policy and national security?  What concerns does this raise with 
regard to their sense of self when we ask such actions of our fellow countrymen and 
women; and can we justify the potentially questionable actions of the foreign nationals 
we recruit?  More broadly, what sort of moral theory can we use to justify cases of 
human intelligence collection?  Questions such as these will be the focus of this 
investigation.  This paper will be an exploration of the ethics of espionage, specifically 
as it pertains to the human dimension.     
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 This paper is broken down into three major sections.  The first section will deal 
with initial ethical considerations of human intelligence collection.  What sorts of moral 
theories are applicable or not applicable to such cases and do such theories justify all 
cases of human intelligence collection?  Additionally, questions of the self; for example, 
integrity, loyalty, self-respect, guilt, and reluctance are weighed.  How do these 
questions raise concern for the psychological profile and dispositions of our intelligence 
collectors?  How do we ensure we are properly managing our collectors’ moral 
character?  The second section is a presentation and analysis of three hypothetical 
case studies designed to serve as examples from the field and to further elucidate some 
of the major questions of concern.  The final section of this paper is a much broader 
look at the socio-political considerations of human intelligence collection.  Here 
questions of decision-making, responsibility, complicity, dirty hands, and moral culture 
are examined.  Who is complicit/responsible for such operations?  Who should 
determine when to authorize an operation and why should it be that individual or group 
of individuals?  How should we feel about it?      
 It is my contention that justifying cases of HUMINT collection outside of a 
utilitarian construct is a challenge.  While most HUMINT operations are best justified by 
utilitarian moral theories, justifying all HUMINT operations in terms of a utilitarian 
construct creates the potential risk of justifying acts that are so morally egregious that 






Section I - Initial Philosophical Considerations 
 How does one evaluate the actions of human intelligence collectors and the 
spies which they recruit in terms of whether their respective actions are ethical?  One 
can apply a number of different moral/ethical theories to their actions for evaluation and 
the results might vary across the spectrum of good and bad.  For my purposes here, I 
focus primarily on consequentialism and deontological theory.  Let’s start with a 
deontological theory first. 
 Deontological theory, and more specifically for example, Kantianism, can be 
characterized by its strict adherence to duty or obligations.  Such theories are absolute 
in their evaluation of actions because they install a very stiff standard for determining 
whether actions are morally acceptable or not.  Where context, circumstances, and 
states of affairs are up for consideration in a theory like consequentialism, Kantianism 
downplays the importance of the consequences.  The theory holds that some types of 
actions are wrong no matter what the consequences.  Furthermore, for Kant, all actions 
should be taken in accordance with some fundamental principle or maxim.  This 
fundamental principle or maxim is what determines whether or not an action is moral or 
immoral.  According to such a theory, a morally good person will always do his or her 
moral duty in accordance with said fundamental principle or maxim, regardless of the 
consequences.  Doing one’s duty might not produce the most good for the most people; 
it might not even produce good for the individual performing the action, but it will make 
the acting agent a moral person.   
 Kant’s most notable contribution to the field of ethics is his famous categorical 
imperative.  One key formulation of the categorical imperative, the “universal law 
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formulation,” determines whether or not a fundamental principle or maxim is justified: 
“act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
become a universal law (Kant, 34).”  This formulation asks us to imagine the world in 
which the maxim is adopted by all of humanity.  For example, consider a maxim: do not 
lie.  Then consider a world where that maxim is universally adopted by all members of 
the human race.  What kind of world would that be?  Well, it might be an honest and 
transparent world.  By contrast however, consider a maxim such as: do not tell the truth.  
I don’t think it is unreasonable to assume that such a maxim would not be adopted.  A 
world where everyone is a liar would be an unbearable world to live in.  But, what if a 
murderer comes to my door stating they are looking for my sibling to murder them?  
According the categorical imperative, the morally right action would be to tell the 
murderer where my sibling is.  Lying to the murderer and deceiving them would be 
morally wrong – even though my sibling might survive the murderer’s pursuit.  
 Another formulation of the categorical imperative, the “humanity formulation” 
suggests that one should “act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in 
the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means 
(Kant, 41).”  As Kant argues, this seems to capture the truth in the “Golden Rule” – treat 
others the way you would like to be treated.  Again, roughly speaking, the humanity 
formulation tells us to treat people with dignity, respect, honesty, and integrity.  
According to this formulation it would be morally wrong to lie, deceive, and manipulate 
others to achieve one’s own ends or the ends of others.   
 Kant’s absolute theory of morality may be appealing in many contexts, but, at 
least for those of us who think some intelligence operations are morally permissible, it is 
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hard to see how it can help us evaluate human intelligence collection operations.    
Intelligence by definition, is whole-heartedly dependent on its ability to deceive and 
manipulate in order to be successful.  HUMINT as a field would not be able to exist if all 
the collectors followed Kant’s categorical imperative.  Operations would be impossible.  
A collector’s ability to ethically deceive, manipulate, empathize, and build trust with 
others for the purpose of getting them to spy on their native country leaves no room for 
such deontological theories.  The actions of collectors routinely violate the universal law 
formulation and the humanity formulation because things like lying, deception, and 
manipulation cannot be universally applied to the whole of humanity (well, they could, 
but with detrimental effects) and because it treats prospective targets of operations as a 
means to an end rather than an end in and of themselves.  In order to understand cases 
of ethical human intelligence collection and in order to guide collectors in the field, we 
need to move past moral absolutist theories like Kant’s.  The field requires a more 
flexible theory of moral justification.     
 A more flexible theory that could potentially justify cases of human intelligence 
collection is consequentialism.  Contra to Kantianism, consequentialism is less absolute 
in terms of a strict adherence to moral rules that govern action.  Consequentialism holds 
that the only thing that is of absolute value in evaluating the rightness or wrongness of 
an action is the consequences of that action, not the action itself: “Consequentialism 
provides a very simple theory of the right: an act is morally right (or morally permissible 
if and only if it produces the best consequences (Kagan, 61).”  But how does one know 
which consequences are “the best?”  Like traditional consequentialists, I believe that an 
act which produces the best overall consequences (the most utility for the highest 
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number of people) should be considered the best, and therefore right action.  But how 
does one define said utility?  Consider the ethical theory of utilitarianism: the justification 
of a given action is determined only if it leads to the greatest total amount of utility.  For 
utilitarianism, utility is defined as the good or wellbeing.  So, if the consequences of an 
action produce the greatest amount of good or wellbeing for the greatest number of 
individuals, then that action has met the requirements to be considered right, or morally 
justified, in terms of the ethical theories of consequentialism and utilitarianism.  
 The structure of utilitarianism makes it a good fit for evaluating the actions of 
collectors and their sources.  Life in general is complicated, hard, and nuanced.  In my 
view, it is a mistake to apply a strict set of moral rules or principles to actions.  For 
example, there are times, in normal, day-to-day life, when things like telling a lie can be 
justified.  If my spouse asks me if she looks fat in a dress, I don’t think I am morally 
required to say yes to that question, even though I might think that she does.  Similarly, 
espionage is an inherently “grey” profession, where the lines of good and bad, right and 
wrong can become blurry.  Collectors are trained to lie, deceive, and manipulate others 
and their sources for the greater good of their country.  Yes, lying, deception, and the 
manipulation of others is most often considered wrong, however, when the 
consequences of such actions are good, as under a utilitarian theory, such actions can 
be justified.   
 I think most people would agree that in most countries, things like national 
security and foreign policy are important in terms of promoting happiness.  So, if in 
order to better inform policy makers our collectors are asked, and even required, to lie, 
deceive, and manipulate foreign nationals, a utilitarian rational will support the claim that 
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ends justify the means.  To further develop this point, let us now consider a couple 
different types of utilitarianism and their implications. 
Act Utilitarianism   
 Act utilitarianism, broadly, is the kind of utilitarianism we have been considering 
above.  The rightness or wrongness of an action is dependent on the utility of said 
action, where the utility is defined as the level of good or wellbeing promoted by the 
consequences.  Act utilitarianism considers moral/ethical questions on a case by case 
basis.  As we will see, this can be contrasted with rule utilitarianism, which concerns 
moral/ethical questions in terms of setting a precedent for a given act which should be 
followed in the future. 
 By promoting the most good and wellbeing, act utilitarianism makes room for the 
justification of most cases of human intelligence collection.  However, before we adopt 
act utilitarianism we must consider the implications that it has across the full spectrum of 
HUMINT cases.  For one could certainly submit a case, similar to the “ticking time bomb 
thought experiment,” wherein morally egregious or despicable acts could be justified if 
they produced enough overall good or wellbeing.  This topic is something that will be 
considered in more detail in the next couple sections of this paper.       
Rule Utilitarianism 
 As alluded to above, rule utilitarianism establishes a precedent for a given action 
in the form of a rule that should be adhered to in the future for actions to be considered 
right and just.  For example, the color yellow at a stop light means slow down.  For a 
rule utilitarian, always following the rule of slowing down when the light is yellow will 
generally lead to the best consequences and most good/wellbeing, than say, making a 
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“game time decision” whether to speed up or slow down every time the light turns yellow 
– something an act utilitarian would do.  Rule utilitarian’s feel that following rules will 
generally lead to better overall consequences most of the time rather than making 
decisions about actions on a case-by-case basis, even though making decisions on a 
case-by-case basis might lead to more overall good and wellbeing in specific instances.  
Rule utilitarianism attempts to resolve the issue raised by the ticking time bomb thought 
experiment which plagues act utilitarianism. 
 But the rigidity of the rule utilitarianism is what precludes it from being a useful 
moral/ethical theory for evaluating cases of human intelligence collection.  As discussed 
earlier, the realm of spying, much like life, is a challenging place for absolutes.  It is 
complex and nuanced.  Dealing with all different kinds of people from many different 
walks of life make it that way.  One must be flexible, adaptable, and socially aware to 
operate in such circumstances.  Strict ethical rules make it challenging to operate in 
such a manner.  And while there is certainly value in having rules, applying them on a 
case-by-case basis makes more sense for the field.    
 As it stands, act utilitarianism currently provides the best rationalization for cases 
of human intelligence collection.  It is a flexible enough theory that takes context into 
account when determining whether or not actions are justified.  There are reservations, 
however, in terms of the kinds of acts act utilitarianism might justify for the greater good.  
Do the ends really justify the means?    
 Other ethical considerations with regard to cases of human intelligence collection 
concern questions of the self.  How does one manage a profession of lying, deception, 
and manipulation and a normal life?  How does interacting, sympathizing, and 
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empathizing with potentially morally questionable individuals for the sake of national 
security and foreign policy affect the collector’s sense of self, integrity, and self-respect?  
What sort of psychological profile is required for such work and how does the work 
affect one’s psyche?  Let’s take a closer look. 
 One of the biggest knocks against consequentialism and utilitarianism is that it 
requires some people to violate their personal integrity.  For, if all that matters in an 
ethical case is the state of affairs that is produced from a given action, and the best 
state of affairs is the one that promotes the most good and wellbeing, then the action 
which produces such a state of affairs should be taken every time, regardless of the 
integrity or personal point of view of the acting agent.  For example, imagine that I am a 
collector and that there is a source I am trying to recruit because he has information that 
would be extremely valuable to the defense of my country.  The source however, will 
only meet me in a strip club and yet as an individual I am wholeheartedly against the 
idea of strip clubs because I feel they are demeaning and degrading to women.  The 
concern then becomes: do I violate my personal integrity and attend the meetings with 
the source at the strip clubs for the greater good of my country?  Or do I not attend the 
meetings and maintain my integrity thereby causing my country to suffer because we 
could not obtain the information.  Moreover, I am therefore responsible for said suffering 
because I failed to act.  This scenario raises important considerations with regard to 
individual responsibility and personal integrity – “a consideration involving the idea, as 
we might first and very simply put it, that each of us is specially responsible for what he 
does, rather than for what other people do.  This is an idea closely connected with the 
value of integrity.  It is often suspected that utilitarianism, at least in its direct forms, 
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makes integrity as a value more or less unintelligible (Williams, 99).”  The demands of 
utilitarianism ask us to conduct ourselves in such a way as to produce the most good or 
happiness, and yet in doing so, it asks us to neglect our own personal projects or 
commitments that would produce our own individual good or happiness.  This seems 
unreasonably demanding. 
 The concerns over personal integrity and alienation from one’s sense of self are 
very real and certainly applicable to cases of human intelligence collection.  In 
responding to such worries, I think generally people would agree that if we can promote 
the most good for the most people - that is a good thing and we should try to do that 
whenever possible – especially when it comes to national security and foreign policy 
development, it is almost a must for policy makers.  Having said that, however, 
questions of utilitarianism and integrity, specifically the integrity of the personal point of 
view, should be given due thought and consideration.  For example, is it possible to hold 
a utilitarian stance over cases of human intelligence collection while also accounting for 
individual collector integrity, conscience, and self-respect?  I don’t see why not.   
 Consider “sophisticated consequentialism” as described by philosopher Peter 
Railton: “A sophisticated consequentialist is someone who has a standing commitment 
to leading an objectively consequentialist life, but who need not set special stock in any 
particular form of decision making and therefore does not seek necessarily to lead a 
subjectively consequentialist life (Railton, 153).”  Being a sophisticated consequentialist 
allows individuals to be generally concerned with the overall state of affairs, while also 
taking individual integrity into account.  Being a sophisticated consequentialist helps us 
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avoid worries of alienation from our integrity, projects, and commitments while also 
promoting the best state of affairs.       
 Furthermore, from a practical perspective, there are measures in place whereby 
a collector has the ability to hand their source off to another collector should they be 
assigned elsewhere or the workload becomes too consuming.  The source could simply 
be handed off to a collector who has no issues of personal integrity with the nefarious 
hobbies of the source.  To be sure, candidates looking to become HUMINT collectors 
need to be honest with themselves and know going into the profession that they might 
have to deal with morally questionable individuals.  Issues arise however, should the 
source require action so despicable or egregious that the integrity of every collector 
would be violated.  Such operations then become a question of strategic, national policy 
too be determined by decision-makers.     
 The questions of integrity raise even more concerns.  Where do and should a 
collector’s loyalties lie: loyalty to one’s personal commitments and/or loyalty to one’s job 
and country?  Additionally, what about loyalty to the source?  What sort of loyalty do 
they deserve considering sources can run the gamut of reasonable, decent, human 
beings to unreasonable, morally bankrupt individuals?  In terms of self-respect, should 
the collector decide to act on a morally questionable source, should he or she feel some 
sense of reluctance towards the action? Some sense of guilt?  Moral remainder?    
 Certainly, loyalty to one’s country and a strong sense of integrity are screening 
criteria for becoming a human intelligence collector.  Moreover, in some countries 
character, selfless service, professionalism, and honesty all play a role in the selection 
of HUMINT collectors.  In the United States for example, the above traits are a 
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requirement for the majority of federal employees and especially so for those holding 
security clearances.  Individuals who volunteer for such positions go into the profession 
knowing the level of self-sacrifice and selflessness required in serving one’s country.  
Collectors in the most sensitive areas know the information they are collecting is of the 
utmost value to decision-makers and can be part of the reason their operations are so 
sensitive.  Volunteers know that it is possible to be operating in morally ambiguous 
environments, but they continue on anyways for the sake of their country.    
    But should a necessity for feelings of reluctance, guilt, and moral remainder be 
something we consider in our selection and training of collectors?  I would argue yes.  
The existence of moral conflict necessitates that in some situations, moral persons who 
seek to do the right thing will have their ethical purity violated.  When this happens, 
agents are praised for doing what they must as morally upstanding persons, yet must 
also bear the moral cost.  This triggers an appropriate moral emotion (De Wijze, 457).  
The implications of the absence of such moral emotions are two-fold: (1) Feelings of 
reluctance, guilt, and moral remainder indicate the existence of a moral value system.  
The lack of such a system raises major red flags in terms of questioning a collector’s 
loyalty to his or country, which could have disastrous consequences.  (2) Feelings of 
reluctance, guilt, and moral remainder can result from the violation of a collector’s 
integrity and alienation or estrangement from one’s commitments.  But that can be a 
good thing!  For, do we really want a morality without alienation, estrangement, or 
separation from one’s commitments?  If alienation from one’s commitments didn’t exist, 
then people would just do whatever they want.  We want morality to tell us what we 
should do.  Some alienation is good.  It helps guide our actions (Railton, 162).  Such 
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feelings should be considered normal but not to the affect that there are negative 
psychological repercussions. 
 The absence of things like moral character and empathy can indicate 
questionable psychological traits like sociopathy.  Yes, we want our collectors to feign 
things like sympathy, empathy, loyalty, and trust but only as operational tools for 
achieving operational success.  We don’t actually want our collectors to be sociopaths, 
with questionable moral character, who lie, deceive, and manipulate everyone they 
meet.  You can’t trust people like that.  And in a profession where collectors are 
expected to operate as a singleton in potentially dangerous, morally ambiguous 
environments that can be extremely sensitive to the reputation of nations and to the 
lives of individuals - one must be able to trust one’s collectors.  This makes the profiling 
and dispositions of those who volunteer and who are eventually selected for such 
operations extremely important.  So important in fact, that some countries have 
designed their psychological testing and screening processes for HUMINT collector 
selection to specifically identify sociopaths and eliminate them from selection altogether. 
 In closing this section, our argument up this point leads us to the following 
tentative conclusions.  First, deontological theories like Kant’s cannot guide our thinking 
about espionage ethics because their absolutist views would rule out normal espionage 
activities that bring about great good.  Second, act utilitarianism is an improvement over 
absolutist deontology and it helps us see why espionage activities that bring about great 
good are morally justified.  But, act utilitarianism threatens to justify extreme acts that 
are intuitively morally heinous and that threaten the integrity of those who preform them.  
To avoid those results, I suggest that we adopt a sophisticated consequentialist view of 
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espionage ethics.  In what follows I will further support these conclusions by examining 
concrete cases.   
Section II – Case Studies 
Fabricating Academic Credentials 
  Syed Arif Sadiq is a senior advisor to Pakistani President Ashfaq 
Yusuf.  Sadiq has access to large quantities of classified documents in the 
office of the president, including secret reports of President Yusuf’s 
meetings with foreign leaders.  Sadiq has regular professional contact with 
Walter McHenry, the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in 
Islamabad.  Through McHenry, Sadiq meets CIA officer James Thurman.  
Sadiq and Thurman have sons who attend the same international high 
school in Islamabad.  The two boys become friends and spend time 
together in each other’s home.  The parents become better acquainted at 
school functions for their sons and soon begin socializing together. 
  The Sadiqs’ dream is to have their son Jamaat study at a top 
university in the United States.  The problem is that Jamaat did not apply 
himself in high school and made poor grades.  He also has a reputation 
for having a bad attitude and for getting into trouble. His SAT and TOEFL 
(Test of English as a Foreign Language) scores are excellent, but without 
grades and good recommendations his prospects for getting into a 
selective U.S. University are dim.  Sadiq shares all of this with Thurman 
and asks for his advice.   
  Thurman believes he can recruit Sadiq as a CIA source in return for 
getting his son into the right U.S. university.  The CIA has the capability of 
fabricating an impressive high school transcript for Jamaat and of forging 
glowing recommendations for him from teachers and administrators.  In 
addition, the CIA can agree to secretly pay for Jamaat’s schooling, since 
the cost of education at an elite private university in the U.S. would be 
beyond the family’s means.   
  Sadiq wants his son to apply to Georgetown, Rice, Duke, Stanford, 
and Dartmouth.   
  Would it be morally acceptable for the CIA to fabricate academic 
credentials for Jamaat and to pay for his education in return for Sadiq’s 
agreement to work for the CIA as a source inside the president’s office 
(Olsen 154-155)? 
 
 From a deontological perspective, this case cannot be considered morally 
justified.  The universal law formulation and the humanity formulation of the categorical 
imperative are both violated.  For starters, it is hard to imagine that adopting a maxim of 
fabricating academic credentials would be a rational choice in a universalized world.  
15 
 
What sort of effect would this have on higher education if applications were being 
fabricated?  Widespread fabrication of high school credentials would lead universities to 
no longer trust transcripts and letters of recommendation like the one in question.  In 
such a world, the CIA’s plan would never work.  So, it would not be rational to try to get 
the source what he wants by fabricating the academic credentials in such a world.   
 Additionally, a theme across all the case studies presented, is our collectors’ 
violating the humanity formulation by treating their sources as a means to an end rather 
than an end in and of themselves.  In this instance, Sadiq is treated as a means to an 
end, rather than an end in and of himself.  The only reason the collector has befriended 
Sadiq and empathized with his situation is to recruit him as a source inside the Pakistani 
president’s office.  This is not a real relationship built on dignity, respect, and the 
integrity of his source.  Moreover, as it regards loyalty, while the argument could be 
made that the collector does retain loyalty to his source, the loyalty is only retained 
insofar as it allows the collector to achieve mission accomplishment.  His true loyalties 
lie with the mission and any loyalties outside that are feigned in service of the mission.  
In essence, there is a double violation of the humanity formulation: fabricating the 
application disrespects the university and the deception of the source disrespects the 
source.           
 From a utilitarian perspective, this scenario is an example of the question of the 
means justifying the ends and of “necessary evil.”  In a moral dilemma, “the agent 
cannot avoid doing evil whatever he does.”  And in the case of a necessary evil, “though 
wrong doing is inescapable, there is rationally best course of action (Haksar, 333).”  
Such is the world our collector’s live in.  Our collector has two options: (1) help the 
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source fabricate academic credentials so his son gets into an American university and 
in doing so violate U.S. law, the institutional integrity of the university, and deny 
admittance to a student that would otherwise be deserving to attend; all in the name of 
information on the Pakistani president and American foreign policy/national security. Or, 
(2) do not help the source fabricate academic credentials for his son so as not to violate 
U.S. law, preserve the institutional integrity of the university, and enable the admittance 
of a worthy student to the university; however, the source does not agree to work for the 
collector and we lose information highly valuable to U.S. foreign policy development.  
Act utilitarian’s only see one correct option here.  However, there are drawbacks.  
You’re damned if you do and you’re damned if you don’t.  In fact, it could also be argued 
that each choice, depending on the point of view, was a necessary evil: evil that 
protected American laws or evil that failed to protect and inform the homeland.   
 To conclude, lets summarize roughly how the theories under consideration would 
respond to such a case.  Deontic theory does not justify the acts in this case.  
Deontology would not allow us to utilize and manipulate people and academic 
institutions in such a manner.  However, this is not without a cost: a morally absolute 
collector would not be able to acquire the intelligence needed.  Act utilitarianism would 
say that the CIA should fabricate the academic credentials: use the source as a means 
to access information inside the Pakistani president’s office.  And lastly, sophisticated 
consequentialism would agree with act utilitarianism because one can recruit a source 
such as the one above without being a sociopath or having to violate the collector’s 




Prostitute for Terrorist 
  The CIA has had a major intelligence success.  It has recruited a 
penetration of an important al Qaeda cell in Hamburg, Germany.  This 
new source, encrypted FZOBSTACLE, is providing the CIA with extremely 
valuable intelligence on terrorist activities and personnel, not only in 
Germany but also throughout Europe.  His information has proven to be 
accurate and reliable.  On the basis of FZOBSTACLE’s reporting, two al 
Qaeda operatives have recently been arrested in Madrid.  Also, thanks in 
large part to his intelligence, an al Qaeda terrorist attack against the U.S. 
Embassy in Stockholm was prevented.   
  At a secret meeting in a safehouse in Hamburg, FZOBSTACLE 
asks his CIA case officer to provide him with a prostitute.  He says it would 
be dangerous for him to frequent the red-light districts in Hamburg, 
because he knows the German police patrol there heavily, and he is 
concerned about the risk of disease.  FZOBSTACLE therefore asks the 
CIA to arrange a discreet rendezvous for him with a medically cleared call 
girl.  He adds that if the CIA does not comply with his request he will break 
off contact, and the CIA will lose him as an intelligence source. 
  Would it be morally acceptable for the CIA to procure a prostitute 
for FZOBSTACLE (Olsen, 101)?   
 
 Based on discussions earlier and the context of the scenario at hand, it is pretty 
clear that the majority, if not all cases of human intelligence collection would be 
considered immoral under a deontological framework.  Even if some cases did manage 
to somehow seep through the cracks, this instance in particular could not be considered 
moral because it violates the humanity formulation of the categorical imperative (in a 
number of ways actually).  First, the case officer is treating the source as a means to an 
end, rather than an end in and of himself: the case officer is looking to achieve 
operational success through the source.  Additionally, even the source is violating the 
humanity formulation by looking to procure a prostitute.  Individuals who procure 
prostitutes are treating prostitutes as a means to an end, rather than an end in and of 
themselves.  The case is flatly immoral under a deontological framework. 
 From a utilitarian perspective, this scenario could be considered a serious moral 
issue and the morally right course of action depends on contingent facts about what will 
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best promote utility.  The question of where the money to pay for a prostitute is coming 
from is a major concern.  Obviously, the CIA’s budget is covered by the U.S. federal 
government fully supported by U.S. taxpayers.  How would American taxpayers feel 
knowing that their well-earned money is being spent to pay for a prostitute?  There have 
been real-world examples where similar cases required authorization from the President 
himself, and I tend to think rightly so.       
 Assuming that the purchase of the prostitute is authorized by the President, it is 
then made clear that the U.S. deems this specific instance justifiable, if not morally 
acceptable, and the President is willing to accept responsibility on behalf of the 
American people.  The question of responsibility also raises farther questions with 
regard to personal integrity, insofar as threats to individual integrity depend on who is 
deemed the responsible agent.  For example, if the dirty hands are to be pinned on the 
individual who actually procures the prostitute, assuming it’s the collector his or herself, 
what concerns does this raise with regard to his or her personal integrity?  I believe that 
most American citizens would be very concerned if their government employed 
collectors who helped procure prostitutes and who have no reluctance in doing so.  If 
we view prostitution in a negative light, such a case could create a conflict between our 
collector’s integrity and loyalty.  Procuring a prostitute might go against our collector’s 
personal integrity, commitments, and projects, and yet not procuring said prostitute 
would violate our collector’s sense of loyalty to duty, mission, and country.  Such an 
example is an interesting feature of the topic at hand and is applicable regardless of 
where complicity and dirty hands fall.   
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 To conclude, lets summarize roughly how the theories under consideration would 
respond to such a case.  Deontic theory does not justify the procuring of a prostitute.  
Act utilitarianism suggests that we should do whatever most maximizes utility.  In this 
case, hire the prostitute for FZOBSTACLE because the information he is providing is 
preventing terror attacks throughout Europe.  Consideration can be given to the 
individual who hires the prostitute (collector or not) and whether it violates his or her 
conscience or integrity, but this consideration will most likely be outweighed by the 
overall good and wellbeing produced.  Sophisticated consequentialism asks us to focus 
more on what it would mean to have collectors with the kind of psychological profile or 
disposition towards the justification of such an act.  They would certainly be good 
collectors because they would achieve operational success – terror attacks would be 
prevented, however, as was mentioned earlier, American citizens might have their 
reservations if they found out that prostitutes are being procured in their name.  This is a 
utility cost that should be weighed.  Having collectors who have no issues of integrity or 
conscience with such actions could be utility maximizing at the end of the day if the 
American citizens don’t find out about the actions.  Additionally, operational success can 
be achieved without concern over traits of sociopathy in the collectors.         
Child Prostitute 
  There is a serious threat of war with North Korea.  The North 
Koreans have massed troops on the border with South Korea and have 
engaged in increasingly belligerent rhetoric.  They have at least ten 
nuclear warheads in their arsenal and have stockpiled 5,000 tons of 
chemical warfare agents.  Last fall, the North Koreans successfully tested 
the latest version of their Taepo-Dong missile, which the CIA now believes 
is capable of reaching targets as far away as the U.S. Midwest.  In 
response, the U.S. has increased its military presence in South Korea to 
nearly 80,000 troops.   
  The CIA has recruited an outstanding North Korean source 
encrypted, DBMIRROR.  DBMIRROR is a senior North Korean official who 
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travels outside the country regularly on official business.  He has a 
universal contact plan so he can initiate contact with the CIA wherever he 
shows up.  His intelligence reports on the North Korean military threat, 
leadership politics, and secret negotiations with the Chinese have 
received the highest evaluations. He is the CIA’s only high-level HUMINT 
source in North Korea.   
  DBMIRROR is corrupt and venal.  He was originally recruited in 
Copenhagen while serving there as the North Korean ambassador.  At 
that time, he asked for and received from the CIA a recruitment bonus of 
$500,000 in cash.  Since then, he has been paid a monthly salary of 
$50,000, which is deposited into a secret Swiss bank account.   
  DBMIRROR is in Bangkok to represent North Korea in sensitive 
discussions with regional officials.  When he can break away from his 
duties and colleagues, he meets secretly with his CIA case officer in an 
alias-rented hotel room.  He is providing extremely valuable intelligence on 
the crisis on the Korean peninsula.   
  At one of the meetings, DBMIRROR asks the CIA to provide him 
with the services of a pre-pubescent girl for his carnal pleasure.  He says if 
the CIA does not comply, he will break off the relationship. He insists he is 
too high profile to take the risk of procuring a young girl on his own.  Child 
prostitutes of this kind are readily available in Bangkok.   
  Would it be morally acceptable for the CIA to provide DBMIRROR 
with a child prostitute (Olsen 103-104)?          
 
 From the intuitive or common-sense point of view child prostitution is morally 
heinous and clearly wrong.  So much so, in fact, that we can place it in the same circle 
of morally abhorrent acts such as torture, rape, and genocide.  Clearly such acts are 
physically and psychologically life altering to the victim, but something that adds to the 
repulsive nature of such acts is the existing or manifested psychological effects on the 
trigger-person or perpetrator, not to mention the effects on their personal integrity.  The 
negative psychological effects and negative effects on individual integrity are part of 
what make such actions wrong; plain and simple.  But even though such actions seem 
intuitively wrong, might there be a time when they are justified?  One of the only ways 
an ethical theory could allow for such an act (because clearly deontological theory does 
not apply here), such as the purchase of a child prostitute for a highly informative 
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source, would be if the theory considered the consequences of the action as the sole 
determining factor of justification of the given action – a utilitarian ethical theory.    
 Consider the ticking time bomb thought experiment again: is it morally acceptable 
to torture one individual such that many people will live?  Supporters of the utilitarian 
viewpoint would argue that because torturing the individual would save many lives and 
produce the must good, torturing the individual is morally justified and right.  Critics of 
the utilitarian view might take a more deontological perspective and argue that torture is 
wrong based on the character of the act of torture; or they may point to the individual 
doing the actual torturing and argue that the effects committing torture has on that 
individuals psyche and personal integrity are reason enough to consider torture wrong.          
 I bring up the ticking time bomb thought experiment because it has similar 
features as the current scenario.  A utilitarian might argue that the ends justify the 
means.  Buying a child prostitute for the North Korean source so that he keeps 
providing information that will either deter a war or end the war quickly so that hundreds 
of thousands of lives are saved, is justified and morally right because it reduces the 
amount of life lost and promotes the most possible good.  But does that really make 
child prostitution in this context, morally right?  I don’t think so.  Following common 
sense intuitions that I believe most people share it seems that there are some actions, 
as mentioned earlier, that are certainly wrong.  
 So what sorts of conclusions can we draw about the above case studies?  
Certainly, the moral norms defended by deontological perspectives struggle to justify 
the actions of our collectors and more senior ranking decision-makers.  That much is 
clear.  Additionally, in presenting the above case studies, my purpose is to walk the 
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reader through a series of ever escalating moral/ethical dilemmas of espionage wherein 
the application of a utilitarian theory of ethics does not seem to be unreasonable 
(fabricating academic credentials), to the point where, a utilitarian theory of ethics has a 
hard time justifying the actions of the agent, regardless of the perceived positive 
consequences (child prostitute).  Now, some will question the legitimacy of an ethical 
theory that doesn’t work all the time.  After all, all that is involved in the denial of a 
consequentialist theory of ethics, is that with respect to some type of action, there are 
some situations in which that would be the right thing to do, even though the state of 
affairs produced by one’s doing that would be worse than some other state of affairs 
accessible to one (Williams, 90).  Certainly, we could, if we wanted to, make act 
utilitarianism the governing moral theory of human intelligence collection activities.  
However, the repercussions of such an absolute course leaves open the potential for 
thinks like rape, torture, and genocide to be considered “justified” should the 
consequences of such action produce an overwhelming amount of good.        
 So, the question then becomes, should we blanket the gamut of human 
intelligence collection activities under the umbrella of consequentialism and 
utilitarianism?  Just because it is one of the few, if not the only ethical theory that 
justifies actions in such cases, does that mean in every case if the good produced 
outweighs the actions of the agent and his source, the action is justified?  At least in the 
United States, policy and law is very clear as to which persons are prohibited as 
sources of information and what types of activities are considered prohibited.  This 
indicates that there is point at which the means no longer justify the ends.  Cases of 
human intelligence collection generally operate under the ethics of utilitarianism, but for 
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some countries, there is a cutoff where the theory is deemed unfit.  But who decides 
where the line is drawn?  Why did they draw the line there?  And what gives them the 
right to draw the line?    
 There is a flip side to that coin as well.  Consider an amalgam of the ticking time 
bomb thought experiment and the child prostitute case, where-in a child prostitute must 
be provided to the North Korean official to prevent the explosion of a nuclear bomb that 
would take millions of lives.  Clearly, child prostitution is wrong, and providing a child 
prostitute to a source is wrong.  However, providing the child to the North Korean official 
will result in millions of lives being saved.  In some countries, policy and law does 
stipulate that such actions are never authorized, however a review and waiver process, 
through high ranking government officials exists, wherein the policy and law may be 
bypassed in extreme circumstances.  Is this not similar in a way to the previous point 
with regard to where the cutoff for utilitarian application ends?  Who gets to decide 
when a waiver should be granted?  And what gives them the right to grant the waiver?     
 The question of cases that fall within politically established laws and policy, and 
can be considered reasonably justified in light of a utilitarian perspective are relatively 
straightforward.  The actions of the collector and his or her source are justified because 
the states of affairs and amount of good produced sufficiently rationalizes the action.  
But it seems there are things, we as human beings are just simply not ok with and are 
morally absolute in our scorn for.  Once the line has been crossed into the realm of 
things like torture, rape, and genocide, utilitarianism falls off and moral absolutism takes 
hold.  And that’s ok.  The question then becomes, what moral theory are we holding to 
for the identification of such acts?  Clearly not a deontological one because, as we have 
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seen deontology can’t apply here, and we have reached the limits of what reasonable 
persons can expect from utilitarianism.   
 How do we determine which acts are so morally abhorrent that they should never 
be committed and can never be justified regardless of the consequences?  I think this 
depends on the audience in two distinct but co-existing ways: individual moral 
conscience and socio-political moral conscience.  By individual moral conscience I 
means things like personal integrity, loyalty, the individual point of view, and virtue 
theory.  All of these things come together to form a perspective from which individual 
projects/commitments are undertaken, plans are developed, events are observed, and 
life is lived.  Each individual perspective constitutes, among other things, a locus relative 
to which harms and benefits can be assessed and are typically assessed by each 
person’s individual perspective to form their individual moral conscience (Scheffler, 56).  
Socio-political moral conscience, on the other hand, is the social, cultural, and political 
collective moral compass of the group or country.  It represents the integrity of the 
country – the collective moral conscience.  The morality of the audience or country is 
determined in these two ways.  At times the individual moral conscience will be at odds 
with the socio-political moral conscience and at other times they might be congruent.  
The point is that the relationship is fluid.  Individual moral consciences can change and 
this could potentially affect the greater audience or vice-versa.  Deontological theories 
cannot capture this dichotomy, but I think sophisticated consequentialism can.  Viewing 
such cases through a sophisticated consequentialist lens allows collectors to produce 
maximum utility, while at the same time retaining their integrity, and not being 
sociopaths.  They need to have a conscience, but they can’t be deontic moral agents.  If 
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they were deontic moral agents then they would be ineffective collectors and unable to 
produce maximum utility.  So, our collectors need to be sophisticated consequentialist 
agents who generally are motivated by conscience and integrity, and draw a line at 
morally heinous acts, but they also have to follow utilitarian thinking more than ordinary 
agents do.  This is significant because this is partly how a determination is made as to 
which acts are so morally abhorrent that they should never be committed.  In closing 
this portion of the paper, the final section is a closer look into the socio-political 
considerations of cases of human intelligence collection.            
Section III - Socio-Political Consolidations 
 In the last section the focus was on three cases and the argument that 
sophisticated consequentialism generates the best approach in terms of thinking about 
what the morally best action to take would be.  My discussion suggests that 
sophisticated consequentialism will provide the best approach to thinking about other 
cases and the ethics of HUMINT more generally, but I won’t attempt to establish those 
broad conclusions here.  Instead, I want to turn to some additional topics that a more 
comprehensive account of the ethics of espionage might address.  Specifically, I will 
turn from questions about right and wrong action to questions about moral responsibility 
and dirty hands. 
 At the highest levels of government, citizens of a given country would hope that 
decisions being made on their behalf with regard to foreign policy and national security 
are informed.  Knowledge, information, and intelligence are paramount in making such 
decisions, especially for information that would be considered sensitive.  In the United 
States for example information on a recent North Korean ICBM launch or nuclear test, 
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information on the People’s Liberation Army-Navy activities in the South China Sea, and 
information on potential Russian Federal Security Service involvement in the 2016 
presidential elections -  all would be extremely valuable to U.S. policy-makers.  But 
information of that sensitive a nature, information that foreign countries deem sensitive 
enough to safeguard and keep secret, isn’t just readily available through open source 
channels.  Nations have to make a concerted effort of time and resources to acquire 
that information.  This is where HUMINT collectors are so valuable.  They can get that 
information in a clandestine manner that goes unnoticed by the local population or 
target nation.  The information can then be processed, analyzed, and disseminated as 
intelligence to consumers, the most crucial of which, of course, are national policy-
makers.   
 But which direction does the arrow between foreign policy/national security and 
intelligence go?  Does it go from foreign policy/national security to intelligence?  Or vice 
versa?  I think the answer to that question depends on the country of interest.  In some 
countries I’m sure hardline, proactive national security directives drive the intelligence 
requirements and so those countries focus their collection efforts accordingly.  Other 
countries might be a bit more reactive toward their foreign policy/national security 
policies and base their intelligence collection requirements and efforts on the states of 
affairs around them as they occur in real time.  And I’m sure still other countries 
maintain a more give and take relationship between the two poles to allow for maximum 
flexibility and adaptability. 
 I bring up the relationship between foreign policy/national security and 
intelligence collection, not because any way is the right or wrong way of doing things; 
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certainly each country has their own priorities and should act in its best interest, but 
there are implications in terms of complicity and dirty hands depending on which 
direction the arrow goes and how democratic a given nation is, especially as it concerns 
highly sensitive or morally questionable collection efforts, such as those mentioned in 
the above case studies. 
 There are a couple of different ways to look at the problem of dirty hands and 
complicity for cases of human intelligence collection.  One way would be to suggest that 
it is not possible to be complicit and have dirty hands without making a causal 
contribution to a given act.  So, I pull the trigger behind a gun that kills someone: I am 
causally responsible for their death.  I push someone down a flight of stairs and they 
break their leg: I am responsible for their broken bones.  However, consider this 
example: 
  George, who has just taken his Ph.D. in chemistry, finds it 
extremely difficult to get a job.  He is not very robust in health, which cuts 
down the number of jobs he might be able to do satisfactorily.  His wife 
has to go out to work to keep them, which itself causes a great deal of 
strain, since they have small children and there are severe problems 
about looking after them.  The results of all this, especially on the children, 
are damaging.  An older chemist, who knows about this situation, says 
that he can get George a decently paid job at a certain laboratory, which 
pursues research into chemical and biological warfare.  George says that 
he cannot accept this, since he is opposed to chemical and biological 
warfare.  The older man replies that he is not too keen on it himself, come 
to that, but after all George’s refusal is not going to make the job or the 
laboratory go away; what is more, he happens to know that if George 
refuses the job, it will certainly go to a contemporary of George’s who is 
not inhibited by any such scruples and is likely if appointed to push along 
the research with greater zeal than George would.  Indeed, it’s not merely 
concern for George and his family, but (to speak frankly and in 
confidence) some alarm about this other man’s excess of zeal, which has 
led to the older man to offer to use his influence to get George the job…  
George’s wife, to whom he is deeply attached has views (the details of 
which need not concern us) from which it follows that at least there is 




Is George responsible for the continued propagation of the CBW?  The notion of 
negative responsibility would suggest that he is.  Failure to act or choosing not to act is 
action as well.  Negative responsibility is a key feature of any consequentialist ethical 
theory and the notion suggests that responsibility and complicity are relational.  “An 
action or omission can be complicit with respect to one instance of wrong doing while 
undermining (and thus failing to be complicit) in another (Driver, 262).”  You are just as 
morally responsible for things you fail to do, as the things you do, do.  So, if we are 
going to consider cases of human intelligence collection under the guise of 
consequentialism and utilitarianism, then we must accept that complicity and dirty hands 
can extend beyond causal contribution.  But how far, and to whom?        
 To make headway in our thinking about responsibility, it might be useful to focus 
on what is called “the division of moral labor.”  Policy-makers and decision-makers in 
government are charged with the national security and foreign policy development.  
They are a point within the relationship between national security/foreign policy and 
intelligence wherefrom action can originate.  The policy-makers we are concerned with 
for our purposes here, make decisions about national security and foreign policy that 
result in action.  “The point is that it is a predictable and probably hazard of public life 
that there will be these situations in which something morally disagreeable is clearly 
required.  To refuse on moral grounds ever to do anything of that sort is more than likely 
to mean that one cannot seriously pursue even the moral ends of politics (Williams, 
60).”  Nine times out of ten, policy-makers, when asked to make decisions, will justify 
their decision through a consequentialist framework. 
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 Take the prostitute for terrorist case study above for example: a prostitute is 
authorized to be purchased for a source, for the sake of national security.  Whose 
hands are complicit and whose hands are dirty in such a scenario?  If the President 
were the final, authorizing authority for the purchase, is it his hands which are the only 
dirty hands?  Or do the citizens of the country who elected him have dirty hands as 
well?  After all, theoretically his decisions are made in the name of the people.  Where 
does the complicity lie?  Is everyone from the President down to the person who 
actually, physically pays for the prostitute complicit in the act?  To resolve such 
questions, Philosopher David Archard suggests a “division of moral labor.”  “This moral 
division means that politicians get their hands much dirtier than the public whom they 
represent, but that the democratic public is still complicit to a degree in their 
representatives’ actions (Archard, 788).”  Based on the nature of their work as policy-
makers, it is demanded of them “both that they carry the weight of decision-making that 
leaves them with dirty hands (and on occasion hands that can never be cleaned) and 
that they be of a certain moral character.  We wish them to be persons who clearly and 
distinctly recognize the moral ‘disagreeableness’ of what they do.  They must be able to 
dirty their hands on our behalf but acknowledge exactly what it is to have dirty hands 
(Archard, 782-783).”  Politicians are elected because people know they can carry the 
weight of the dirty hands that a democratic public doesn’t wish to carry.  While the 
democratic public still retains responsibility as the electorate, it is that same 
responsibility which allows them to remove politicians from office for other more 
egregious actions.  In the end, there are actions which are going to be unethical even 
though they may be justified according to policy and decision-makers.  “The point is that 
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only those who are reluctant or disinclined to do the morally disagreeable when it is 
really necessary have much chance of not doing it when it is not necessary      
(Williams, 62).”  
 Another social factor that we need to keep in mind when assigning responsibility 
is attitude – namely, the attitudes of the potential audience.  Attitudes and values about 
action are significant because they can be an indicator of one or a group’s virtue.  
“Virtue involves having the right kind of orientation or attitude toward what is deemed 
good or evil (Driver, 76-77).”  Let’s make one thing very clear.  Spying, of the type being 
discussed here, is illegal in every country on the planet and is a violation of international 
law – and yet it happens in every country on Earth.  A country’s attitude towards spying 
can vary based on the socio-political climate of the country.  Is the country engaged in a 
civil war or some sort of state-vs-state conflict?  Perhaps each country’s respective 
citizens are more open to spying.  Is the country experiencing a period of peace and 
prosperity?  Perhaps the county’s citizens frown upon spying.  One kind of attitude 
worth nothing that is potentially harmful is the kind of attitude that results from a kind of 
nationalist mania or a fixation on a kind of “us-versus-them” climate.  This “with us or 
against us” attitude can appear when the threat is perceived as so great and the odds 
so insurmountable, that it creates an attitude and environment of “anything goes” and 
“the gloves are off.”  This can be very dangerous to countries that practice democracy 
because the legal and moral norms which govern the actions of regular individuals 
might be suspended by those that view themselves as advocates of the homeland.  In 
the field of intelligence collection and even in the greater national security sphere, such 
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an attitude can be very dangerous for intelligence professionals and for the country 
which they represent.       
 One thing is evident, however, due to the nature of HUMINT operations, leaders 
and decision-makers are required to weigh the risks should sensitive, potentially harmful 
or politically embarrassing operations be compromised and come to light.  A very 
important factor has to do with one’s audience, and what the audience makes of a given 
action, or what the agent can reasonably expect the audience to make of the action 
(Driver, 266).  The attitudes and values of the nation conducting the operations and the 
attitudes and values of the target nation, all play into the decision of whether or not to 
act on a given operation.  This is telling because who makes the decision and what 
position they hold has influence in terms of responsibility.  For example, in 2015, the 
United States was caught tapping, then German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cell phone.  
Clearly, decision-makers at the time felt that the information gleaned from tapping her 
cell phone was of enough value so as to outweigh the risk of compromise.  When the 
tap was discovered it brought outrage from the German’s and embarrassment for the 
United States.  Why would the U.S. tap an allied leader’s cell phone?  Especially during 
a time of peace and prosperity between the two nations.  The incident was 
embarrassing for both countries. 
 The wiretapping of the German chancellor’s phone is an example of how things 
like moral attitudes, values, and context all play a role in weighing the consequences of 
a given action, the utility of a given action, and who is responsible for said action.  At 
times, a given problem set could be so complex and convoluted that the correct answer 
isn’t sitting there in black and white.  A full account of which actions are right and wrong 
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and of moral responsibility would need to take all these facts (about complex attitudes, 
the moral division of labor, etc.) into account in order to be satisfactory.  HUMINT 
operations need to be handled on a case by case basis because there are simply too 
many variables that must be evaluated. 
 In closing, let us revisit the key question of this investigation: how does one 
morally justify human intelligence collection operations?  What theories are applicable?  
Which are not?  And if they are, what is the scope of their application?  It has been 
shown that duty, rule, or obligation based deontological ethical theories like Kantianism 
cannot justify human intelligence collection operations because they are morally 
absolute.  Such theories consider some actions absolutely right or wrong, just or unjust 
regardless of the intention of the agent or the resultant consequences.  Such theories 
are not resilient or versatile enough accommodate the level of moral/ethical adaptability 
required of HUMINT collectors and their operations.  Moreover, such theories neglect 
actions in the profession that although they may be ethically wrong in the eyes of the 
moral theory, would otherwise produce a substantial amount of good for the greatest 
number of people. 
 A moral theory that can justify human intelligence collection operations is 
sophisticated consequentialism.  Sophisticated consequentialism can justify HUMINT 
operations because it considers the utility of the resultant consequences of a given 
action while also accounting for things like integrity and conscience.  HUMINT 
operations serve the purpose of providing intelligence to national decision-makers for 
the sake of the survival of the homeland – something that can produce a large amount 
of good for the country’s citizens.   
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 Theories like act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism, while at times applicable, 
are not without their flaws.  Questions of individual integrity and the morally heinous 
plague these theories.  For example, it is possible for act utilitarianism to justify acts like 
torture, rape, or genocide, should the consequences of those actions produce enough 
good.  This is not ok.  The scope of utilitarianism and its oversight of HUMINT must be 
reined in by policy and decision-makers.  Due to their nature as politicians, they are 
imbued with the power to make tough decisions about potentially morally unjustified 
actions (in the eyes of utilitarianism) that result in a less optimal amount of good 
produced, because some things (like rape and torture) are just plain wrong.  To be sure, 
their status as leaders and decision-makers requires of them that they carry this moral 
burden of complicity and dirty hands.  It is their patriotic duty to those who elected them.  
 Justifying cases of HUMINT collection outside of a utilitarian construct is a 
challenge.  While most HUMINT operations are best justified by utilitarian moral 
theories, justifying all HUMINT operations in terms of a utilitarian construct creates the 
potential risk of justifying acts that are so morally egregious that they should never be 
committed regardless of the potentially positive consequences.  Sophisticated 
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